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The Arab Spring of 2011 is acknowledged as a turning point for the Arab 
world. While there were high expectations at the outset regarding the de-
mocratisation of the region, at present pessimistic assessments predomi-
nate, given the numerous wars and the return of authoritarian rule. At least 
four misconceptions about the Arab Spring can be identified, and these pro-
vide information important for a more realistic appraisal both of the likeli-
hood of future democratic reforms and of the challenges to lasting stability 
in the region.
 •  Many Western observers were surprised by the Arab Spring, despite numerous 
indications of deep dissatisfaction among the people of the region, and even 
though most of the deficiencies of authoritarian rule and of economic underde-
velopment had been recognised for decades.
 •  The expectation that the Middle East would democratise based on a Western 
model ignored the fact that democratisation was not a priority for most protes-
tors, partly because of the Janus-faced use of the term “democracy” by Western 
actors in the region.
 •  Despite some shared characteristics among the region’s countries, the Arab 
Spring was not a homogeneous movement. Aside from similar structural prob-
lems and some general demands on the part of demonstrators for dignity and 
justice, the protests took a different form in each country.
 •  As a result of the electoral success of moderate Islamists and the rise of violent 
jihadist actors, some observers postulated an “Islamic Winter” sweeping the 
region. But this perspective has proven to be somewhat flawed, as the increas-
ing level of confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites and between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Salafists, as well as the proclamation of the ISIS caliphate, 
have plunged political Islam as a whole into an identity crisis.
Policy Implications
Contrary to the initial hopes for a fundamental reform or even a revolution vis-à-
vis existing conditions, the Arab Spring has left in its wake a region that  evinces 
deep cleavages and that is characterised by violent conflicts. Nevertheless, 
Western countries must not revert to their pre-2011 political approach,  alleging 
that the pursuit of regional stability justifies supporting the  reinvigorated 
 authoritarian regimes.
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The Arab Spring as a Turning Point
In early 2011, mass demonstrations that would go down in history as the “Arab 
Spring” shook the Middle East. Except in the small Gulf monarchies of Qatar and 
the united Arab Emirates, there were demonstrations against the ruling regimes 
in every Arab country. In some countries, they developed into broad protest move-
ments crossing ethnic and religious boundaries. long-standing despots were over-
thrown in Tunisia, Egypt, libya, and Yemen (Rosiny 2011; Richter 2011). Rightly so, 
these occurrences are spoken of as a major historical event (Perthes 2011), a turning 
point for the Middle East.
However, almost none of the initially high expectations held by most of the 
people in the region were met. Neither were fundamental reforms implemented nor 
were – except in the case of Tunisia – constitutionally guaranteed and state-pro-
tected civil rights and liberties introduced. Through a mixture of a carrot-and-stick 
approach, cosmetic reforms, financial incentives, a ramped-up use of both surveil-
lance technology and methods of state repression, and even violent suppression of 
the opposition, most autocrats succeeded in co-opting, dividing, intimidating and, 
finally, subduing the heterogeneous protest movements. Following a short period of 
instability, many authoritarian regimes were able to consolidate their rule. After the 
world market price for crude oil first began to drop in 2014, the economic and so-
cial situation in most of the region’s countries became even more critical. The root 
causes of the waves of protest in 2011 – authoritarian regimes and long-standing 
socio-economic crises – persist unabated.
Only in Tunisia, whose President Ben Ali fled the country on 14 January 2011, 
was a regime change initiated which led to a process of democratisation that has 
managed to endure – though it should in no way be seen as irreversible. In  Syria, 
libya, Yemen, and Iraq, mutually reinforcing violence in protests that began peace-
fully escalated between demonstrators and forces of state repression. These conflicts 
led to civil wars that are ongoing and whose flames are being fanned by intervening, 
rivalling regional powers. The consequences of the dramatic regional upheavals ex-
tend to Europe: in the power vacuum of failed states, jihadists from Al-Qaeda and 
the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (IS) have established themselves, carrying out 
terrorist attacks worldwide. Millions of people are fleeing war and violence. So far, 
only a small portion of them have made it to Europe, but it was enough to throw the 
European union into a serious crisis. How is it that the Arab Spring, which once had 
been such a beacon of hope, ended up escalating into civil wars in some countries 
and leading to the restoration of autocrats in others? Do the prerequisites for a 
fundamental reform of political systems not (yet) exist in the Arab world? Was the 
expectation of widespread democratisation expressed by exogenous forces and by 
certain actors in the region unrealistic from the get-go?
In a critical review of the events of 2011, four misconceptions related to the 
Arab Spring can be identified.
The Onset of the Arab Spring: Out of the Blue?
Many researchers and politicians were caught off guard by the Arab Spring’s onset 
and by the speed with which it spread throughout the region. In the course of 2011, 
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various publications asserted that the Arab Spring “came out of the blue.” Even 
today it is still claimed that the developments of early 2011 could not have been 
predicted (see, for example, Howard and Walters 2014). If, however, the situation 
before 2011 had been more carefully examined, one would have noted indications 
that increasing protests were taking shape. There had been demonstrations since 
the 1990s in most of the countries of the region – around corruption, despotism, 
social injustices, and economic inequality. Workers struck for higher wages and in 
protest of massive job loss. Most of these protests remained relatively localised, 
limited to the national realm, going unremarked upon at the regional and global 
levels. This began to change only at the turn of the millennium, as protests prolifer-
ated in several countries. The Second Intifada in the Palestinian territories in 2000, 
the uS-led Iraq War to topple Saddam Hussein in 2003, and the publication of the 
Muhammad caricatures in 2005 drew people to the streets from Morocco to Yemen. 
These demonstrations of discontentment, however, were only obliquely directed at 
the respective country’s authoritarian regime. Often, inactivity on foreign policy 
was the sole complaint directed towards the regime. but in some cases, even then, 
there were instances of protest explicitly targeting the ruling autocrats; most of 
those protests were repressively quashed.
Moreover, many of the deficits named by the Arab Spring demonstrators had 
been recognised for years. In the first decade of the 2000s, a group of Arab scholars 
drafted the Arab Human Development Reports, [1] an impressive documentation of 
the political, economic, and social problems of the region. Economic underdevel-
opment and enormous wealth gaps within and between countries were accompa-
nied by a high rate of youth unemployment in most of those countries. Globalised 
media and a sharp increase – on paper – in the level of educational attainment 
raised  people’s expectations. but because of inadequate education, a lack of jobs, 
and abusive treatment by the state, these expectations largely went unmet, particu-
larly in the republican regimes. The classified American embassy cables published 
by Wikileaks shortly before the Arab Spring corroborated the corruption of the Arab 
regimes and laid out in black and white what most people in the region had already 
suspected. In the particular case of Tunisia, the publication of evidence of the extent 
of corruption within President ben Ali’s family played a key role in the outbreak of 
the protests there. [2] 
Therefore, it was not a question of whether but when the collective disaffection 
would finally boil over. Nevertheless, not a single one of these deficits has yet been 
redressed. In fact, many of the problems have even intensified and come to a head 
since the initial drop in the crude oil price in 2014. The political elites still see no 
need to introduce reforms and are instead once again focusing on stabilising their 
political power.
The Arab Spring: A Democratic Movement?
At the beginning, many observers viewed the protest movements of the Arab Spring 
in the context of latecomers to the “third wave of democratisation,” to use Samuel 
Huntington’s terminology. Some argued that the events that have taken place in the 
Arab world since 2011 belong to a “fourth wave of democratisation” (Joffe 2011), 
while others spoke of even a “fifth wave" (Engin 2011) whose origin is the Middle 
1 The reports are avail-
able online here: www.
arab-hdr.org (16 Septem-
ber 2016). 
2 See https://search.
wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/09TUNIS492_a.
html (16 September 2016). 
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East. Area experts, however, were more cautious in their judgments; though, even 
some of them considered the establishment of democratic conditions to be the main 
objective of the developments in the region (Gerges 2013).
It quickly became clear that these descriptions were too optimistic; at best, they 
were premature. Even in Tunisia, the model country of the Arab Spring, the democ-
ratisation following a Western example that many had hoped for remains a deficient 
and crisis-prone process. In Egypt, the prospects for democracy were crushed by an 
army coup in 2013; democracy hardly had a chance in any of the other countries. As 
a result, one could speak of a total failure of democracy in the Arab world. 
In our view, it was flawed, exogenous wishful thinking right from the beginning 
that underlay the idea of a “wave of democratisation.” The Arab Spring produced 
only very few demonstrators who demanded the introduction of democracy. The 
protestors’ demands focused much more on issues of justice, freedom, and dignity, 
and they spoke against despotism, corruption, and clientelism. In some countries 
there were voices calling for the “overthrow of the system,” but not in a single coun-
try was there significant demand for the installation of a liberal democracy. This 
does not mean, however, that the people of the region were not interested in democ-
racy or that Muslims are inherently incapable of living under a democratic system. 
The reasons that the introduction of liberal democracy was not at the core of the 
Arab Spring are multifaceted and can be explained within a historical context.
Protestors came from nearly every single stratum of society. They publicly de-
plored a reality that no longer corresponded in any way to the visions and promises 
that the leaders of the republican regimes themselves had championed since inde-
pendence (Schumann 2015). Nevertheless, in the course of 2011, secularists, Islam-
ists, and the diverse, fragmented former opposition forces in each of those camps 
were unable to formulate a shared alternative vision of political order. The most 
significant actors from among the opposition groups viewed the future division of 
state power as, first and foremost, a zero-sum game. Except in the case of Tunisia, 
opposition forces were not capable of creating a new form of political power balanc-
ing that could have set in motion a process of democratisation. This failure of new 
(and old) political elites to find a political compromise can be explained essentially 
by three factors:
First, over the past several decades, the authoritarian regimes have suppressed 
the secular opposition and parts of the Islamic opposition, relying on the argument 
that divergent political thought would threaten national unity and security. As a 
consequence of this, a culture of critical political debate could not be established. 
Second, the authoritarian rulers have convinced the West that, given the threat 
posed by political Islam, their form of “guided democracy” is the preferable alter-
native. After the attacks of 11 September 2001 and in the joint “War on Terror,” 
the West silently accepted the repression of protests, resumed its arms delivery, 
and supported, in the form of generous financial assistance, the purported reforms. 
From the West’s perspective, the primacy of political stability was clear, even if that 
rule was authoritarian (Schlumberger 2012). Third, the people of the region were 
suspicious of liberal democracy, viewing it as a concept that the West, in the pursuit 
of its own interests, selectively either instituted or – when democracy ran counter to 
the West’s interests – suspended. The united States used the idea of the introduc-
tion of democracy to legitimise its invasion of Iraq in 2003, flouting international 
law. but the West had also supported, or at least tolerated, military coups following 
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elections won by Islamists in Algeria in 1992 and against Egypt’s elected president, 
a member of the Muslim brotherhood, in 2013, in addition to having boycotted the 
Hamas-led government elected in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 2006. Many 
opposition actors therefore doubted the sincerity of the West’s intentions when the 
latter demanded the introduction of “real” democracy in the Middle East.
The Arab Spring: A Homogeneous Movement?
A third misconception is that the Arab Spring was a cohesive protest movement 
across the entire region. There were large areas of overlap in the causes of the dis-
contentment, the forms of mobilisation, and the overarching demands for justice 
(adala), freedom (hurriya), dignity (karama), and respect (ihtiram). Those simi-
larities notwithstanding, there were big differences from country to country that 
prevent us speaking of a homogeneous movement. The composition of the protest 
movements, the initiation and eventual direction of the demonstrations, the con-
crete demands of the opposition, and the reactions to those demands on the part 
of the authoritarian regimes – a mixture of repression and modest accommoda-
tion – were sometimes strikingly divergent. These differences correlate to wealth 
gaps across the region and within individual states: a particularly drastic contrast 
is represented by the Gulf monarchies on one side and Yemen, Egypt, and Syria on 
the other. In addition, social stratification, education levels, and the degree of in-
dustrialisation and urbanisation in each country shaped the make-up of the protes-
tors and their concrete demands in addition to the resources available to both the 
opposition and the authoritarian regimes.
because of these differences, the dynamics of the protests also differed, as did 
each regime’s reaction. We can describe three basic constellations, which went on 
to develop in country-specific ways:
1. In some countries, including Egypt, lebanon, Morocco, and Oman, youth from 
among the educated middle classes of the urban centres called for protest via 
their social networks. Modern media allowed many more people to be reached 
and drove the transnationalisation of the protests, which is why the number 
of demonstrators was unexpectedly high when viewed against earlier, similar 
events. Furthermore, the youth in some countries succeeded in politically acti-
vating segments of the lower and middle classes. State repression did not end 
the protests; rather, it led to their further mobilisation and expansion.
2. In Tunisia, Jordan, bahrain, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, the protests started out 
on the periphery and were carried by groups that were discriminated against 
throughout the region or along socio-economic, sectarian, or ethnic lines. Only 
subsequently did countrywide movements emerge, movements that in some 
but not all cases succeeded in bringing the protests to their respective country’s 
centre of power. In some countries – for example, Saudi Arabia – the protests 
were completely limited to a few groups and a few areas outside of the capital. 
Protests raged on and intensified only in places where the urban and peripheral 
orientations could be united to form a wide national movement; this was the 
case in Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, libya, and Egypt.
3. The countries also differ in their experiences with past protests and uprisings, 
which served to shape the character of the exchanges between the regime and 
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the opposition during and after the Arab Spring in ways that were specific to 
each country. In states with histories of civil war, such as lebanon, Sudan, and 
Algeria, as well as in Palestine and Iraq, protests either did not take place at all 
or were relatively moderate. It was not an infrequent worry that further socio-
political polarisation could lead to renewed violence.
In addition, the ways that militaries and security forces in each country reacted to 
the protests differed. Tunisian forces refused to follow orders to shoot at demon-
strators, while in Egypt the police initially carried out such an order. later, Egyptian 
military leaders arranged for the immobilisation of the police and the resignation of 
President Mubarak, not least in order to secure their own positions of power in the 
state and in society in general. The Egyptian army is in possession of major com-
mercial enterprises, so its leadership has a direct interest in hindering attempts at 
drastic economic reforms and certainly in preventing a radical shift in the balance 
of power. The Tunisian army, by contrast, aligned itself with the demonstrators 
against the regime. The Syrian army experienced several desertions but no split, 
and the segment of the security apparatus that is loyal to Assad is still fighting the 
uprising with exceptional brutality.
Arab Spring, “Islamic Winter”?
When the Muslim Brotherhood won majorities in the first free parliamentary elec-
tions in Egypt and Tunisia, respectively in 2011 and 2012, many Western observers 
were not just surprised but also disappointed that liberal forces in the opposition 
had received such little support from their own people. It was feared that the whole 
region would be vulnerable to Islamisation and concomitant radicalisation – ad-
ditionally because the local branches of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria, which would 
emerge as the “Islamic State” in 2014, were gaining traction. For area experts, how-
ever, the success of moderate Islamists did not come as much of a surprise; they 
recognised that many of the Islamists had been critical of the region’s authoritarian 
rulers for decades and therefore enjoyed high credibility among broad swathes of 
the population. In addition, Islamist actors were committed socially and economi-
cally on the local level in that they provided welfare services, schools, and educa-
tional opportunities and ran their own commercial enterprises, creating thousands 
of jobs.
Nonetheless, disappointment regarding the elected Islamist governments’  failure 
to adequately deliver concrete government services and fulfil economic promises 
contributed to their overthrow – in Egypt, in the form of mass protests and a mili-
tary coup in July 2013, and in Tunisia as its people handed Ennahda an electoral 
loss in October 2014. As a result of that, fundamentalist Salafists in those two coun-
tries demanded an intensification of religious principles, but did not offer any real 
solutions to basic social and economic problems. Moreover, the civil wars that had 
flared up in Syria, Libya, and Yemen created arenas of violence that facilitated the 
spread of jihadists prepared to use violence. This development culminated in the 
proclamation of a caliphate in Syria and Iraq by IS in June 2014.
The overthrow of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, the increasingly sectarian 
nature of regional power conflicts between “Sunni” Gulf monarchies and “Shiite” 
Iran, and the aforementioned proclamation of the cult-like, apocalyptic caliphate 
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led to an enormous crisis in the religious self-projection of Sunni Islam. Whether 
moderate Islamists will end up radicalising in a climate of state repression and civil 
war, or whether they will be able to develop a more tolerant and pluralistic model 
to counter the radical one embodied by Al-Qaeda and IS, represents one of the most 
salient unknowns for the future of the region (Rosiny 2016).
Realistic Prospects for the Arab World
The Arab Spring was not spurred by coincidental or spontaneous protest move-
ments. Much more responsible were the pervasive structural conflicts that have 
been plaguing the relationship between the rulers and the ruled in Arab states for 
decades. corrupt authoritarian regimes that had acceded to power in the 1950s and 
1960s as leaders of nationalistic republics with noble visions of political and eco-
nomic progress proved themselves at the beginning of the twenty-first century to be 
institutionally and economically underdeveloped states and deeply divided socie-
ties evincing massive wealth gaps. crossing social, ethnic, and religious bounda-
ries, the Arab Spring was an expression of despair that reached critical mass at the 
beginning of 2011 despite both huge restrictions on freedoms and overt repression. 
Democratisation was on the minds of only very few; the movements were primarily 
about resolving grievances and achieving dignity, freedom, and justice. Tragically, 
not one of the demands in these areas has been met. In fact, the gap between the 
rich and the poor has widened, and the chances are fading that a comprehensive 
reform of the relevant political systems will take place. Worse still, a power struggle 
over regional leadership positions is causing local conflicts to escalate into bloody 
proxy wars. The drop in global energy market prices that began in 2014 aggravated 
these problems, as the regimes had to restrict their spending on material benefits.
With reference to the bleak situation in Syria, libya, Iraq, and Yemen, Sunni 
regimes such as Sisi’s Egypt and oil-rich Saudi Arabia caution that the alternative to 
their “stable” rule is neither political freedom nor democracy, but civil war and Is-
lamist terrorism. The political elites are polarising their own people at the expense 
of certain ethnic and religious communities, presenting themselves as the “protec-
tors of the people,” and warning of foreign conspiracies and the threat posed by 
Shia Iran in order to justify the persecution of problematic critics and oppositional 
groups (Gengler 2016).
Neither Perthes (2015) nor lynch (2016) foresees a decline in violence.  European 
and other Western countries must prepare themselves for further fragmentation, 
including widespread violent conflicts and enduring confrontations between civic 
protest groups and repressive regimes. This pessimistic perspective is more  realistic 
than the fantasy of guided democratisation that was popular among European 
governments prior to the Arab Spring. What consequences will all of this have for 
scholarly engagement with the region, and what challenges will arise for German 
and European foreign and development policy?
Speaking from an academic perspective, we must not fall into old patterns of 
interpretation and assert that either a culturally contingent rejection of democracy 
or the lack of state institutions was responsible for the crisis in the region. An exclu-
sive focus on the allegedly stabilising role of authoritarian regimes is also of no help 
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here. In our view, there are three uncharted areas to which future research should 
look for a new perspective:
1. What current and future goals and strategies are being developed by moderate 
Islamist actors? Too little is known about how they will position themselves re-
spective to the reconsolidated autocracies, the rise of Iran, the entrée of Russia 
into the concert of regional powers, the acts of violence carried out by Islamist 
terrorists, or with regard to the most urgent problems in the realms of social 
and economic development.
2. What conceptual and practical opportunities are there to establish power-shar-
ing agreements among diverse religious, ethnic, social, and ideological groups? 
In the face of autocrats maintaining their grip on power and civil wars ending in 
military victories – which further weaken the states and generate only resent-
ments and a desire for vengeance among those on the losing side – how can 
political actors be convinced that power sharing would be a win-win for all par-
ticipants? What country-specific differences should be taken into account in the 
design and implementation of such arrangements? (Rosiny 2012, Rosiny 2015) 
3. In what ways can the endogenous resource base be sustainably improved? 
Would it make sense, for example, to introduce new taxation systems? What 
kind of resistance would such initiatives encounter and how could that resist-
ance be tempered? What kind of benefits for the call to political participation 
might be derived from all of these processes?
It will be a great challenge for Western politics to avoid reverting to a pre–Arab 
Spring mindset, which saw the West, focused primarily on regime stability, sup-
porting dictators – ostensibly in order to prevent anarchy and Islamist terrorism. 
The desire for stability is tempting, but with it comes the significant risk of engen-
dering, in the best-case scenario, a second Arab Spring or, in the worst-case scenar-
io, the further spread of civil wars, terror, and state failure. Therefore, the following 
aspects must be part and parcel of a realistic and sustainable Middle East policy:
1. Germany must immediately cease arms exports to violent actors in the region 
and condemn arms exports by other countries, such as the united States, Rus-
sia, France, Great britain, Eastern European countries, and china. Purported 
partners in the stabilisation, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, have be-
come the region’s arsonists, stoking the fires of ethnic-sectarian and ideological 
polarisation and contributing to the military escalation. In this way, they are 
partly responsible even for the latest mass refugee movements resulting from 
the wars in Syria and Yemen – as are, indirectly, the arms suppliers that facili-
tate these wars. 
2. The German federal government and other European governments must ener-
getically appeal to the Gulf monarchies to refrain from politicising ethnic-sectar-
ian differences. This polarisation (which is being driven by the monarchies  mostly 
for reasons reflecting political power calculations – via, for instance, religious 
programming over satellite channels), continues to feed off of itself and gener-
ate a religious hatred that nourishes radical groups such as the “Islamic State.”
3. Germany and Europe must campaign more assertively for the establishment of 
inclusive, power-sharing governments in order to achieve the greatest possible 
level of participation among the various ethnic-sectarian, social, regional, and 
ideological groups and actors in Arab states. Only in this way can the exclusion 
of large portions of the population from political decisions and socio-economic 
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development be overcome and a long-term stabilisation of the states, as well as 
the sustainable growth of the societies, be achieved.
4. The national budgets of Arab states – which are primarily financed through the 
export of natural resources, transfer payments from the rich oil monarchies to 
poorer states, and development aid – are on the verge of fiscal collapse. This is 
why replacing rentier-state revenue streams with sustainable and transparent 
sources of income – such as value-added taxes, corporate taxes, and income 
taxes – is considered a significant challenge. It is therefore in the interest of 
German and European politics to prioritise support for such reforms and simul-
taneously ensure that new taxes and fees are applied along the principles of 
social cushioning.
One of the most important strategies for research and politics, one which has thus 
far been under-utilised, would be to take a more pro-active refugee policy. The  policy 
of the German federal government, increasingly orienting itself towards “defending 
against the flows of refugees” and “fighting the terrorist threat,” should be replaced 
by a comprehensive strategy to tackle the root causes of the fleeing. The policy can 
certainly include a (temporary) admission of refugees from areas engulfed in civil 
war, in order to facilitate a local de-escalation, in that young men can escape the 
forced recruitment by fleeing. Many neighbouring states of centres of conflict such 
as Syria are already overwhelmed in terms of refugee intake. If the violent conflicts 
should spill over into lebanon, Jordan, or Turkey because of these conditions, even 
larger numbers of refugees will set out for Europe.
Making a well-rounded education available to the refugees we take in can also 
contribute to sustainable engagement with the root causes of the fleeing. After the 
civil wars have ended, the refugees educated in Germany can be a particularly valu-
able resource for reconstruction programmes in the government and private sectors 
of their home countries. 
Addressing these aspects as part of an academically sound research programme 
that would also include political consultation poses wide-ranging challenges for 
scholarship and consultancy on the Middle East. In order to really be able to cap-
ture the complexity and dynamics of such a multifaceted and conflict-laden region 
and to derive concrete plans of action, it is necessary to cultivate a viewpoint that 
is objective and historically grounded, that attests to regional experience, and that 
is bolstered by findings from comparative area studies (CAS) on other regions. It 
may be a platitude, but in the context of German area studies today, it is not a given.
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